“A anomalia brasileira,” by Valerio Arcary, appeared first in its Portuguese original on Brasil de Fato on 10 December 2025.
“Following Lula’s return to power in 2023, the progressive dynamic reasserted itself, and Brazil was removed from the hunger map. Nevertheless, Lula’s reforms have significant limitations. Inequality has decreased, but by such a small amount and at such a slow rate that it is exasperating.”
— Valerio Arcary
Those who sow injustice will reap misfortune.
Popular Portuguese proverb
The unity of the herd forces the lion to lie down hungry.
African proverb
1.
Brazil’s social structure may be captivating, but it’s widely regarded as one of the most inequitable countries worldwide. We are a diverse people and a young nation in a vast country that is home to the grandeur of the Amazon, samba, Villa-Lobos, Chico Buarque, Rio de Janeiro, the Pantanal, the mountains of Minas Gerais, and the largest working class in the Southern Hemisphere. All of these things are wonderfully abundant and cannot be put into words. But if Brazil is beautiful, it is also monstrous. The Brazilian anomaly lies in its extremely high degree of social inequality. This is especially unusual compared to societies at equivalent or lower stages of economic development. There are countries where poverty is greater — even much greater — but only a few African nations have higher income concentration rates than Brazil. The Brazilian case is unique. There is something extraordinarily abnormal about this peculiarity of peripheral capitalism in Brazil. In 2024, the Gini index of per capita household income in Brazil reached 0.506, the worst in Latin America. Brazil has approximately 433,000 millionaires. In 2024, the income of the richest 10% was 13.4 times higher than that of the poorest 40%. The percentage of the population living in poverty — defined as earning R$694 (US$6.85) per month — fell from 27.3% in 2023 to 23.1% in 2024 but remains around 50 million people. The percentage of people living in extreme poverty fell from 4.4% to 3.5%, though it still affects more than seven million people. Income concentration is growing exponentially among the top 1%, and even more so among the top 0.1%. This exceptionality requires an explanation.
2.
Within Brazil’s bewildering and reactionary political tradition, leaders of the ruling class have consistently disregarded social inequality. At times, they have even argued that growth is the key to reducing poverty. However, there are several interpretations of inequality within bourgeois social thought. Broadly speaking, there are five different — though not mutually exclusive — arguments: (a) The doctrinal liberal hypothesis naturalizes social inequality as inevitable because people have different capacities. Social equality would require destroying individual freedom; (b) The dominant neoliberal hypothesis argues that labor productivity is low because the masses have little education. Raising wages would cause a demand shock that supply would not be able to meet, leading to hyperinflation; (c) Another neoliberal version views inequality as a side effect of innovation and competition. Reducing it would require higher economic growth rates and attracting foreign investment, which in turn would require reducing the “Brazil cost;” (d) A fourth position defends equity or equal opportunities against reducing social equality through State intervention. This intervention is denounced as welfare because it disproportionately burdens taxpayers and leads to the the State’s enlargement through the expansion of public services, with the ensuing inhibition of the competitiveness of microentrepreneurial business initiatives. The last position argues that inequality is conditioned by the nation’s economic, social, and cultural backwardness. According to this position, the socialization of poverty would turn Brazil into a new Venezuela or a new Cuba.
3.
Several hypotheses are also considered within the leftist tradition. First are the historical and social factors. (a) There has never been a capitalist society without social inequality because the exploitation of workers through the extraction of unpaid labor or surplus value is inherent to the system, as revealed by Marx’s research since the 19th century; (b) However, Brazilian capitalism has been exceptional since the beginning of colonization. Not only did slavery prevail for 350 years, but Brazil was also the largest destination for enslaved Africans, as revealed by the works of Caio Prado and Clóvis Moura; (c) Another distinctive feature of peripheral capitalism in Brazil is that it perpetuated large estates until the 20th century. Even after abolition, Brazil never accepted agrarian reform, which condemned the vast majority of people to exclusion from land ownership rights, as denounced by João Pedro Stédile; (d) Brazil’s historical uniqueness has been structural racism and sexism. The uninterrupted discrimination against Black and female populations explains the special conditions of labor exploitation, as pointed out by Rui Mauro Marini and Silvia Federici. The peculiarity of the late historical transition from an agrarian world to hyper-accelerated urbanization — accomplishing in just two generations a shift equivalent to what central countries achieved in five centuries — was the maintenance of brutal social inequality over the largest working class on the periphery. This was ensured by successive dictatorial regimes.
4.
Such leftist interpretation of inequality does not diminish the importance of historical and social factors; rather, it adds economic and political factors. (a) Brazil’s comparative advantages, which made it the largest destination for foreign investment from the end of World War II until the end of the 20th century. These advantages included an abundance of raw materials, a large proletariat, the largest domestic market for consumer durables, and a relatively stable bourgeois political rule. However, this imperialist rule perpetuated inequality; (b) The Brazilian bourgeoisie is the richest and most powerful in the Southern Hemisphere. It has developed a culture of exercising political power to circumvent internal divisions. This culture has ensured concerted transitions in the face of most crises and ruptures only in exceptional cases. It has attracted the majority of the middle classes to defend its domination. (c) The historical middle class originated from European immigration. It enjoyed a process of upward economic mobility over four generations. They benefited from a social status so privileged by whiteness compared to the inhumane conditions of exploitation of the mostly black masses, who rarely came close to meeting popular demands; (d) This structural relationship of forces unfavorable to workers was reversed in a few, but extraordinary and impressive struggles, such as after the defeat of Nazism and Fascism in 1945, the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, and the final phase of the struggle against the military dictatorship until the end of the 1980s. The Workers’ Party — Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) —, the Unified Workers’ Central —Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) —, the Landless Workers’ Movement — Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) —, and the National Union of Students — União Nacional dos Estudantes (UNE) — were formed during this time. Since the end of the dictatorship forty years ago, Lula and Dilma Rousseff have won five elections combined. These victories paved the way for reforms such as the Bolsa Familia program, aimed at providing financial assistance to low-income families. However, these reforms have not changed the degree of structural injustice in Brazilian capitalism. This is because neoliberal dogmas such as fiscal surplus, inflation targets, and floating exchange rates were preserved to reassure domestic debt creditors. Additionally, the tax system focuses on consumption, sparing income and assets. This system leaves 40 million people in precarious conditions, condemned to informality.
5.
From 2004 to 2014, there was a slow but steady trend of reducing poverty and a less pronounced trend of reducing social inequality, particularly among wage earners. However, between 2016 and 2022, this progressive trend was reversed due to the cumulative effects of setbacks since the institutional coup that brought Michel Temer to power and paved the way for Bolsonaro’s election. Following Lula’s return to power, however, the progressive dynamic reasserted itself, and Brazil was removed from the hunger map. Nevertheless, it is clear that Lula’s reforms have significant limitations. Inequality has decreased, but by such a small amount and at such a slow rate that it is exasperating. Why? During the economic recovery cycle between 2004 and 2013, labor demand increased the average wage for less-skilled occupations. This was only possible because the international economic situation benefited Brazil’s growth through the appreciation of commodities and the reversal of the terms of trade. This had previously occurred only during the two world wars. The process ensured the accumulation of reserves and control of inflation. A strong correlation was confirmed between Brazil’s economic growth and that of the rest of the world. Globalization, or the greater internationalization of capital, favored a relative synchronization of economic cycles worldwide. The achievements of weak reformism essentially rested on the pressure generated by reduced unemployment. Brazil has undergone significant transformations over the past forty years, coinciding with the period of democratic electoral rule following the fall of the dictatorship. Some of these changes have been progressive. For instance, the number of Brazilians living in extreme poverty has been cut in half, while the number of young people enrolled in secondary education has doubled. However, these changes have been limited and dependent on continuous agribusiness-led primary sector expansion. The country remains an anomaly.
Fearured image: Social inequality in Brazil. Image originally published on Fohla de S. Paulo. Courtesy of Liga Internacional de los Trabajadores – Cuarta Internacional.
Translated from the original in Portuguese by Rolando Prats.
