“La bataille sera terrible,” an interview with Valério Arcary by Guy Zurkinden, first appeared online on Le Courrier on 27 August 2026, as well as in the print edition of the Swiss media outlet in its No. 166, August 28–30, 2026, 11–12. Read its Spanish translation in “La batalla será feroz.”
“For Lula to win it will not be enough to simply highlight his track record: he will also have to demonstrate his willingness to fight to deepen reforms and ensure a better life for Brazilians.”
— Valério Arcary
Historian, author, and activist Valério Arcary analyzes the immense stakes of the Brazilian presidential election, which pits Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva against the Bolsonaro clan in a clash between two opposing visions for the nation’s future.
In Brazil, this election will be decisive not only for Latin America’s largest country but also for the entire continent. The first round of the presidential election will take place on October 4. It will most likely be followed by a runoff three weeks later. Although thirteen candidates are in contention, the battle will be between only two, who are far ahead of the others in all the polls: the incumbent president, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, who will be seeking a fourth term at the age of 80 for the Workers’ Party (PT); opposed by the far-right candidate, Flávio Bolsonaro, 45, a member of the Liberal Party (PL) and son of former President Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2023). According to Valério Arcary, a historian, professor at the Federal Institute of São Paulo (IFSP), and author of a recent book on the clash between “Lulism” and “Bolsonarism,” a fractured country will head to the polls. It will have to choose between deepening the historic democratic and social reforms—despite their limitations—enacted by the PT, and the massive step backward promoted by the Bolsonaro clan, backed by Donald Trump. The analyst, who is also a longtime activist within the Brazilian left, answered questions from Le Courrier.
Guy Zurkinden
The presidential election will be a contest between Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro. Can we identify a trend, six weeks before the first round?
Valério Arcary
The outcome is completely up in the air. Polls are coming out at a blistering pace. They show a clear lead for Lula in the first round. But in the second round, the two candidates are neck and neck. This is not surprising, as Brazil is deeply divided. Flávio Bolsonaro can count on a majority of the male vote, while more than 50% of women support Lula; the incumbent president wins the vote of the Black and mixed-race population, while Bolsonaro wins the vote of those who identify themselves as white. Lula is very popular among workers earning less than two minimum wages (the equivalent of 500 euros), while Bolsonaro has the support of higher-income groups; Lula wins among Catholics, while Bolsonaro has the backing of Evangelicals, and so on. This fragmentation is evident across the various regions that make up this continent-sized country of more than 210 million people. Lula and the left hold a dominant position in the the Northeast; Bolsonaro in the South.
GZ: In this context, what does the election campaign look like?
VA: The political battle that will unfold in the coming weeks will be decisive. In Brazil, an election campaign is, by definition, unpredictable. So far, we’ve already witnessed, over the past few months, a massive scandal involving Daniel Vorcaro, a banker who financed the Bolsonaro family; rape allegations against Bolsonaro’s running mate, Alfredo Gaspar; and the opening of a police investigation into Lula’s son. And this is only the beginning of what promises to be a bitter struggle, particularly in the event of a second round, which is highly likely. It’s worth noting that Jair Bolsonaro is in custody for plotting a coup attempt in January 2023, and that his political camp is thirsty for revenge. Weather events linked to the El Niño phenomenon—which is expected to be devastating this year—may also play a role in the campaign.
GZ: What are the competing platforms?
VA: Lula will defend his legacy by contrasting it with the disastrous record of Jair Bolsonaro’s term in office, to which Flávio claims to be a successor. He will highlight his successes in the fight against hunger and poverty, in promoting access to education and universities, and in strengthening the public health system. He will also draw on more recent achievements, such as the tax exemption for low- and middle-income earners—and, if approved by Congress before his election, the reduction of the workweek, a historic demand of the labor movement.
At the launch of his campaign, Lula announced a deepening of reforms, particularly in the area of education. He emphasized the central importance of the fight against femicide and defended Brazil’s sovereignty. At the same time, he highlighted the major threat that another term for the far right would pose.
GZ: What does Flavio Bolsonaro stand for?
VA: He advocates a Milei-style platform, attacking the state and promising cuts in public spending—as well as a reduction in debt. At the same time, he will try to position himself as a champion of law and order and repression: more power for the police, the construction of high-security prisons, chemical castration of sex offenders, and so on. In terms of foreign policy, he is fully aligned with Donald Trump. In particular, Bolsonaro intends to participate in the “Shield of the Americas,” a coalition of 18 Latin American countries under the auspices of the Pentagon. In the name of fighting organized crime, this cooperation will facilitate U.S. military interference on the continent.
GZ: Flávio Bolsonaro is trying to present himself as more “moderate” than his father Jair, who is currently in prison. Is that plausible?
VA: No. Flávio is a direct continuation of Bolsonarism, which is a proto-fascist movement. Its goal is clear: to attack all the democratic and social gains achieved since the end of the military dictatorship in 1984. This involves massive privatizations, attacks on public health and education systems, against the pension system—and, in the future, against social programs such as “Bolsa Família” [a cash transfer program introduced in 2003 that lifted tens of millions of Brazilians out of extreme poverty].
Imposing this agenda requires inflicting a historic defeat on the left, the unions, and popular movements—which remain organized and combative—as well as on social movements—feminist, LGBTQ+, environmentalist, and Black movements—which have experienced a significant resurgence since 2013. If Flavio is elected, he will go further than his father, who was held back by the COVID-19 pandemic. In this endeavor, the candidate can count on the support of a broad majority of the Brazilian ruling class, which harbors deep resentment toward Lula and the Workers’ Party.
GZ: What is the basis for this resentment?
VA: The PT has governed Brazil from 2003 to the present, with a hiatus between 2016 and 2022. This period coincided with two major transformations. For the first time in the country’s history, we witnessed the consolidation of a democratic system that guarantees civil and labor rights—and in which the left can participate in elections entirely legally.
Lula succeeded in implementing real social reforms—despite their limitations. Although it remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, Brazil is less poor than it was twenty-five years ago. But in the eyes of the ruling class, these democratic and social advances come at too high a cost.
At the same time, Lula has succeeded in implementing real social reforms—despite their limitations. Although it remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, Brazil is less poor than it was twenty-five years ago. The public, universal, and free healthcare system has been strengthened, even if it remains fragile. Finally, indexing pensions to the minimum wage has ensured a significant improvement in living conditions for 41 million people who have reached retirement age. This is a major change: in the 1980s, life expectancy in Brazil was 45 years.
But in the eyes of the ruling class, these democratic and social advances are too costly. Added to this is the deep fear that Brazilian capitalists feel toward the working classes. This bourgeoisie has, in fact, accumulated extraordinary privileges based on the overexploitation of workers. In their eyes, the fact that a former steelworker has become president represents a threat.
A majority of the ruling class therefore wants to put an end to “Lulism.” This elite, however, is also divided: some of them will vote for Lula reluctantly, for they are more committed to democracy, and they are aware that the Bolsonaro family represents the most backward and brutal sector of the Brazilian bourgeoisie.
GZ: According to polls, nearly 40% of the population would vote for Flávio Bolsonaro in the second round. How can such a result be explained, given that his father Jair’s term in office led to a surge in hunger, an environmental disaster, and the deaths of 700,000 Brazilians during the pandemic?
VA: Bolsonarism does indeed have a mass following. It enjoys majority support among the middle class—composed of small property owners and shopkeepers—but also in certain sectors of the working class. The working class is, in fact, deeply fractured. Among the poorest segments of society, Lula enjoys fervent, almost messianic support. On the other hand, a significant portion of workers with higher incomes and social security coverage vote for the far right.
GZ: How can we explain this popular vote in favor of the radical right?
VA: Thanks to their higher incomes, this group of workers has greater access to consumer goods. This allows them to purchase private health insurance and send their children to private schools, thereby circumventing the shortcomings of the public sector. These workers identify more closely with the ideology promoted by the ruling classes. Some of them even criticize the social transfers that benefit the poorest.
Over the past ten years, this segment of the population has borne the brunt of economic stagnation and inflation, which have taken a toll on their living conditions. All of this fuels resentment toward the PT—stoked by an omnipresent campaign by the right, which accuses the party of corruption. Added to this is the influence of neo-Pentecostal churches, which are linked to the far right. In Brazil, 27.5% of the adult population now identifies as evangelical. Structural racism is also an important factor.
GZ: What role does racism play in support for Bolsonarism?
VA: Brazil was one of the last countries in the world to abolish slavery, in 1888. Although the country has the largest Black population outside of Africa, this population has long been condemned to poverty. This has changed over the past twenty-five years, a period marked by the emergence of a Black middle class in Brazil. This progress is linked to the country’s economic transformations. But it is primarily due to the quota policy implemented by the PT governments, which has promoted access to higher education for historically marginalized populations. Black people now hold positions as doctors, engineers, architects, and teachers. They have access to consumer goods, fly on airplanes, play central roles in soap operas, and so on.
This shift is unacceptable to a segment of the bourgeoisie and the white middle class, who are accustomed to living in segregated neighborhoods and viewing Black people as their domestic workers. This racism leads them to vote for Bolsonaro.
GZ: How can the left prevent a victory by the far right?
VA: There is no ready-made solution. We know that the election will largely be decided in the southeastern part of the country, within the “strategic triangle” formed by the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro. The left’s ability to win in the capitals of these densely populated states will be decisive in offsetting its disadvantage in the rest of the region.
If Flávio Bolsonaro is elected, he will go further than his father, who was held back by the COVID-19 pandemic.
For Lula, it will also be important to increase his support among female voters. At the same time, the PT candidate must continue to appeal to his social base—poor voters—while striving to overcome divisions within the working class. To do so, it will not be enough to simply highlight his track record: Lula will also have to demonstrate his willingness to fight to deepen reforms and ensure a better life for Brazilians.
In other words, he must run a campaign with a distinct left-wing focus. And he must explain the threat that a second Bolsonaro term would pose to the democratic, economic, and social rights that have been hard-won over the past fifty years. These are two antagonistic worldviews that are clashing.
GZ: The presidential election in Brazil is taking place against the backdrop of a Latin American political landscape that has changed significantly.
VA: Across the entire continent, progressive forces are facing an adverse political climate. In 2025, the far right won the presidential elections in Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as the legislative elections in Argentina. In 2026, Trump’s allies—José Antonio Kast, Keiko Fujimori, and Abelardo de la Espriella—took the helm in Chile, Peru, and Colombia.
On January 3, the United States bombed Caracas and took Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores hostage. Since then, they have imposed their control over the government of Delcy Rodríguez. At the same time, Donald Trump is imposing an unprecedented energy blockade on Cuba, which has been reduced to the brink of collapse. In doing so, he is putting his “Donroe” doctrine into practice, according to which the entire American continent must be under U.S. domination. These developments are part of a global trend: the far right, marginalized after the end of World War II, now has mass-based electoral parties that aim to seize power.
GZ: In this context, is there cause for concern about foreign interference in the Brazilian elections?
VA: Yes. For several months now, Donald Trump has been stepping up his provocations and interventions against Brazil. In July 2025, he threatened to impose 50% tariffs on Brazilian imports into the United States. His goal at the time was to prevent Jair Bolsonaro’s conviction. He later backed down. But this summer, he announced tariffs of 25% and 12.5% on nearly a quarter of Brazilian products. His implicit message is this: if Lula is elected, there will be retaliation. This helps instill fear among a segment of the population.
If Lula wins, Flávio Bolsonaro will most likely contest the election results. And it’s possible that Donald Trump will join him. This would represent a major shift: in 2022, President Joe Biden quickly recognized the PT candidate’s victory; Jair Bolsonaro nevertheless planned an attempted coup on January 8, 2023, with the support of part of the military high command. With Trump’s support, there is a real danger that such a scenario could repeat itself.
As for Argentine President Javier Milei, the insults he has repeatedly hurled at Lula indicate that he, too, wants to intervene in the process.
Feature image: Argentine President Javier Milei (left) and Flávio Bolsonaro, the Liberal Party’s presidential candidate in Brazil. Keystone via Le Courrier.
Translated from the original in French by Rolando Prats.





