“Uma eleição indefinida,” by Valério Arcary, originally appeared on A Terra é Redonda on 31 March 2026. Read also on Communis its Spanish translation.
“2026 must be the year of an electoral victory that is, at the same time, a fundamental social and political victory. Nothing is more important than defeating the far right. This will only be possible with Lula’s re-election. A wave of social mobilization by workers is unlikely, so we need a new social bloc to achieve political hegemony.”
— Valério Arcary
From the darkest clouds falls clear, fertile water.
Chinese folk proverb
No matter how big the mountain, it cannot block the sun.
Portuguese folk proverb
You can tell the size of the puma by its tracks.
Brazilian folk proverb
1.
It is not yet possible to predict the outcome of Brazil’s 2026 presidential election. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the race, for at least five reasons: a) although the contest is limited to just two candidates, the election is still more than six months away, and the available polls do not provide sufficient data, given that the race is effectively tied within the margin of error. All this in a context where high disapproval ratings for both Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro have remained above 45%, indicating that the election will likely be decided by a small percentage of the population—less than 10%; b) the possibility that key variables, such as the evolution of inflation driven by the price of oil derivatives due to the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran, could negatively affect all economic expectations; c) Flávio Bolsonaro has consolidated his leadership at the head of the opposition and, in doing so, has relegated Tarcísio de Freitas to the São Paulo elections. Not all candidacies have yet been finalized though—neither for the presidency and vice presidency, nor for state governors, nor has much come to light regarding the ongoing formation of coalitions; d) the repercussions of the new international situation, precipitated by the U.S.-led offensive against Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba, remain very serious, to the extent that they have adversely altered the balance of power, although the final form that this change will take has yet to be determined, all of this exacerbated by the danger that Trump will attempt to manipulate the electoral campaign in Brazil, just as he did in recent elections in neighboring countries such as Ecuador, Chile, and above all Argentina; e) the campaign strategies of both Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro are yet to be defined, but given that a relentless political struggle is foreseeable, it will be the hits and misses what would end up tipping the scales.
A political paradox is currently unfolding. The most historically significant economic indicators are positive, which should put Lula in a strong position for reelection. However, this is not the case. Inflation remains below 5% annually, unemployment below 6%, and average income has risen steadily, reaching a record high of 3,652.00 reais in March 2026, the latter due to tangible increases in the minimum wage. Household consumption has increased, although it cannot be ruled out that debt has also reached unprecedented levels, affecting 90 million people with negative credit histories.
2.
All of this, however, seems to indicate that the economic situation alone is not sufficient to explain electoral dynamics. The material weight of the struggle for survival in the social experience of tens of millions of people is no longer the same. Everything indicates that, even though life has become a little easier, that improvement is not enough to guarantee Lula’s reelection. The country has changed significantly over the past ten years and is moving in step with international dynamics. The social, political, cultural, and ideological entrenchment of the far right is undeniable. The reality is that, despite Bolsonaro’s conviction for the attempted coup and the massive mobilizations of 2025—especially those on September 21 and December 14 against the amnesty—the country remains fractured, and the outcome of the presidential election remains unpredictable.
Over the past four decades, since the 1980s, the balance of social forces has shifted four times in Brazil. The decisive factor, ultimately, that shapes the electoral contest is that we need a change of course that leaves behind the defensive stance that began in 2015–2016. In the 1980s, during the final phase of the struggle against the dictatorship, a social bloc was consolidated that united and mobilized the urban working class, drawing in the country’s poor majority, after a large segment of the middle class shifted toward the opposition and a split occurred within the ruling class.
Political leadership of that bloc was shared by various forces, under the hegemony of a liberal faction that found its main expression in the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) led by Ulysses Guimarães, Franco Montoro, and Tancredo Neves, but with the participation of the Workers’ Party (PT), the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) and Leonel Brizola, which was confirmed by Lula’s presence in the second round of the 1989 presidential elections. In the 1990s, the momentum of the wave of popular mobilization gradually waned, but it was nonetheless capable of ousting Fernando Collor de Mello in the 1992 impeachment trial.
Defeats, however, are defeats, and hegemony passed to a bloc that united the bourgeoisie, won over the mass of the middle class, attracted a portion of the better-off workers, drew in the popular masses, and —following the reduction in inflation facilitated by U.S. support for the renegotiation of the long-term foreign debt profile— ensured the stability of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s two terms and the leadership of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB).
In the first decade of the new century, a new situation emerged and the balance of power shifted once again—this time in a favorable direction. The struggle for power was decided at the ballot box, as the democratic-electoral system took root, and the ruling class accepted Lula’s victory. A new hegemonic social bloc was thus forged in support of the PT-led coalition government, which attracted a faction of the bourgeoisie that was committed to strengthening the domestic market and was encouraged by a shift in global trade terms favorable to raw material exports and by the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves worth over $250,000 million dollars, with the support of the working class and the pull of the poorest and least educated, who had become Lula’s supporters.
However, the era of globalization, which had elevated China to the position of the world’s second-largest power, was hit hard by the brutal crisis of 2008. Although it was overcome through an unusual strategy—monetary easing or Quantitative Easing (combating excess liquidity with more liquidity)—the crisis plunged the economies of the Triad either into stagnation, as in the United States, or into recession, as in the case of Europe and Japan.
3.
In Brazil, the balance of social forces was already deteriorating with the defeat of the initial progressive momentum of the June 2013 wave, but it was from 2015–2016 onward that the moment of truth arrived, and we were defeated by the institutional coup that overthrew Dilma Rousseff’s government. Since then, a faction of the ruling class has shifted toward the far right; a vast majority of the property-owning middle class has become radicalized, drawing in at least half—depending on the region—of the working-class middle strata; and its influence has spread to popular sectors led by neo-Pentecostal churches.
The hegemony of that social bloc led to the victory of Bolsonarism in 2018. That hegemony is now under challenge, but it has not yet been defeated. Lula won in 2022 by a very narrow margin. Had it not been for the catastrophe of the pandemic, we would have been defeated once again. The most serious issue is that history has demonstrated, since the outcome of the 2014 elections, that there is no consensus within Brazilian capitalism regarding the preservation of a democratic-electoral system, as one faction refuses to accept the rotation of power, not even with a moderate left-wing government.
The country made progress in the 1980s because it defeated the dictatorship, though without overthrowing it; it regressed in the 1990s because, despite monetary stabilization, it began a process of denationalization and deindustrialization; it advanced again in the first decade of the new century because it reduced the near-biological destitution of millions of malnourished people condemned to hunger, and since 2016, it has been plunged into the “hell” of a dramatic social fracture that nearly led to a coup led by neo-fascists. In four decades, we have lost twenty years.
2026 must be the year of an electoral victory that is, at the same time, a fundamental social and political victory. Nothing is more important than defeating the far right. This will only be possible with Lula’s re-election. A wave of social mobilization by workers is unlikely, so we need a new social bloc to achieve political hegemony. The battle will be fought on the electoral front, and the election campaign has already begun. Any underestimation is dangerous. Bolsonarism is prepared for a fierce, relentless, dishonest, and demagogic struggle. The third way promoted by Gilberto Kassab has already been defeated. Ronaldo Caiado will serve as Flávio Bolsonaro’s deputy. The Trump factor must be taken seriously. He is a very powerful enemy. This is not the time for either “he’s already won” or defeatism, but for the utmost Marxist realism.
What should Lula’s campaign strategy be? The campaign will not be decided by a comparison between the results of Lula’s administration and those of Bolsonaro’s. It will not be enough to demonstrate the superiority of Lula’s government with statistics, as we can see today with the stable dead heat, over many months, between approval and disapproval ratings. Nor does a mere comparison of their biographies seem promising, as we have learned since 2018. It will not be enough to look back. The people have great personal respect for Lula, but there is also fatigue and a certain social unease.
Lula needs to reinvent himself once again. But this time, not through a “Letter to the Brazilian People” like the one written by Antonio Palocci. Either the campaign adopts a left-wing stance and commits to improving living conditions, or we will face insurmountable difficulties. This involves denouncing Bolsonarism as an accomplice of Trump, but that is not enough. Lula should, starting now, become the daily spokesperson on social media in favor of abolishing the six-day workweek, a tax on large fortunes—provided for in the Constitution for nearly forty years but never implemented—free public transportation, and more. Lula can negotiate the formation of a Broad Front, but he should not compromise on the campaign line by shifting toward the center.
From this it follows that it will be unavoidable to wage the political and ideological struggle between values and worldviews: us against them; the interests of workers and the poor against the owners of wealth; solidarity against greed and privilege; justice against injustice; the defense of women against the violence of the “macho sphere”; Blackness against racism; LGBTQ+ people against homophobia, the indigenous population and the Amazon against mining and agribusiness estates, the energy transition against global warming, democratic rights against coup-mongering, honesty against the corrupt orgy of Banco Master, police intelligence against the military’s “anything goes” approach to invading communities, and so on.
Featured image: Photocomposition of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in front of the Palácio do Planalto in Brazil’s capital. Photo courtesy of The Brazilian Report.
Translated from the Portuguese original by Rolando Prats.
