An abridged and modified version of the following article originally appeared in Spanish on CTXT, issue 329, February 2026.
“The Venezuelan government that emerged from Nicolás Maduro’s kidnapping pays lip service to its ties of friendship with Cuba, but in practice does everything Washington orders it to do. It is a cruel irony how things have been reversed: in 2015, the Cuban government paused its honeymoon with Obama to condemn in the strongest terms the US carrot-and-stick policy. At that time, the carrot was for Cuba, and the stick for Venezuela. For their part, Colombia, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile have remained timid, silent, or—as in the latter case—have fallen directly into the most blatant backstabbing. These leftists treat Cuba as a kind of distant relative—now elderly, sick, and frankly burdensome—for whom they still harbor some patronizing affection, but whom they would all be grateful to see at last pass away. Perhaps they do not even understand that Cuba’s fall would have catastrophic consequences even for the increasingly colorless Ibero-American ‘progressivism.'”
— Iramís Rosique
On January 29, US President Donald Trump declared a national emergency through an executive order describing Cuba as an “extraordinary and unusual” threat to the United States. Those with long memories will recall that these were precisely the words used by Barack Obama in 2015 to declare that Venezuela had become a “threat to the United States’ national security.” Both Trump’s and Obama’s executive orders invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), under which the US president is authorized to set new regulations on international trade, freeze assets, or impose sanctions whenever a national emergency is declared due to “unusual and extraordinary” threats from abroad.
As Trump himself admitted not so long ago, there is not much more that can be imposed on Cuba in terms of sanctions. The economic pressure exerted by the US government on the island is unparalleled. As early as 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that the U.S. blockade against Cuba was “the most comprehensive set of sanctions ever imposed on any country.”[1] Let us bear in mind that in 2007, the additional 243 unilateral coercive measures with which Trump bloated this punitive system during his first term had not yet been adopted. In other words, much of what could be done with the January 29 emergency declaration has already been done. So why this now?
As is well known, the blockade is a dense tangle that structurally weighs down the Cuban economy. However, its application faces limits that Cuba has tried to exploit over the last three decades in order to survive. For example, despite the markedly extraterritorial nature of the Helms-Burton Act, it is not so easy for the United States to sanction a Mexican oil company or a French bank for maintaining commercial relations with Cuba. Going after companies from third countries—although this has been done several times[2]—is often a diplomatic and legal headache that usually ends up in international courts or lead to contentious litigation cases in the World Trade Organization. In the new context, the US executive can impose secondary sanctions on foreigners for reasons of “national security,” which is much more difficult to challenge in international courts.
If to this increased margin for aggression were we to add the fact that the current US administration is characterized by the systematic use of pressure and blackmail and has even confessed its utter contempt for international law, what we get is something like what accompanies this new “national emergency”: Trump has warned that any country that sells or supplies fuel to Cuba will face retaliatory tariffs by the United States. This may be only the beginning of the many “painful measures” that—as Claver Carone announced a year ago[3]—have been designed specifically for Cuba. Nevertheless, on its own, it leaves very little room for other countries to come to Cuba’s aid in one way or another and in fact constitutes a declaration of a fuel blockade that could well turn into a naval blockade for these or other purposes.
What can be expected from Russia and China
A friend who is interested in astrology has referred to 2026 as “the year the masks will come off.” While astrology is not a tool for geopolitical analysis, its metaphors may be relevant in the case at hand. In many sectors of the hemispheric Left and beyond, there is a lingering hope that Russia and China will function as a brake on the United States in its confrontation with Cuba. However, one would be excused to be sometimes under the impression that we still have a romanticized memory of the “Cold War” and, to a certain extent, an inaccurate one, considering that, under the guise of “peaceful coexistence,” the USSR and the United States repeatedly turned a blind eye to each other’s atrocities. Nevertheless, this time, it is not at all unreasonable to look to Russia or China, since, as the siege around Cuba has been reconfigured, of all the island’s allies only those two countries could confront or alleviate it. Russia would not be affected by the new tariffs, as it is already under heavy US and European sanctions, while China, as it has already demonstrated, has ample room to respond to any tariff threat. The question is whether they are really interested in or willing to take the risk that helping Cuba entails.
China does not finance causes at a loss. And not for ideological reasons. Or perhaps yes: political pragmatism is also an ideology.
Cuba is an ambivalent asset. On the one hand, it has held recognized geostrategic value since the days of privateering and piracy: “the key to the Gulf.” Should we extrapolate this truism to 21st-century geopolitics, Cuba could eventually become for China or Russia an unsinkable aircraft carrier 90 miles off the coast of the United States, or an outpost for other types of operations, as the USSR understood at the time. It could also be a center for economic projection into Latin America, especially for China, which has found in Cuba an ally and a proven stable State. On the other hand, however, both Russia and China seem to be frustrated by Havana’s economic management track record and to be making their own political-economic risk assessments with regard to Cuba.
Chinese foreign policy is brutally pragmatic. It is not as ideological as that of the USSR or Mao’s China was, let alone Cuba’s. In this regard, Cuba’s immense debt to China, particularly to private creditors, weighs heavily on the bilateral relationship. For years, both China and Russia have insisted that Cuba carry out the kind of market reform of the socialist model that they themselves, or Vietnam, undertook decades ago. On the contrary, when the Cuban communists attempted to conduct their own reforms, they often insisted that theirs was a different story, unrelated to what had been done in Asia. It should also be remembered that in the 1980s, Cubans harshly criticized the Chinese reforms for its political and social consequences. In this respect, short of life-and-death conjunctures and decisions, Cuba has been the most consistently anti-capitalist country in the whole world. Inevitably painful concessions aside, dictated by the need to survive and salvage Cuba’s revolutionary project in a sea of an ever-expansive hostility—including from all variants of the mainstream or sectarian Left—, the distrust of and even loathe for capitalism has been the deepest and most enduring vein of the ideology of the Cuban Revolution. Perhaps none of this is decisive, but in some way it weighs on the steps that countries with certain political traditions may take in regard to Cuba, but also on what Cuba can accept.
By 2026, it is fair to say that at least that first attempt by the Cubans to reform their socialist model failed. If China believes that the Cuban government is incapable of reforming its economy and that the financial funds and other resources provided to Cuba simply “evaporate” in a morass of bureaucratic inefficiency without generating any return, it will never fully commit to Cuba’s recovery, let alone to the “salvation” of the island. China does not finance causes at a loss. And not for ideological reasons. Or perhaps yes: political pragmatism is also an ideology.
The Kremlin and the White House are clearly flirting with each other on the issue of the war in Ukraine: any Russian challenge to the United States in favor of Cuba could compromise Trump’s obvious partiality to Putin.
On the other hand, it must also be said that China, despite being one of Cuba’s main allies, has always been extremely cautious when dealing with the framework of sanctions imposed on the island by the United States. For Chinese pragmatism, China’s rise to become the world’s leading power is and will remain an absolute priority. And if being too supportive of Cuba increases US hostility toward China and compromises China’s strategic plans, then China’s solidarity with Cuba will have to wait. That is China, and it has always been that way with regard to Cuba.
In any case, China is not an oil-producing country but an oil importer, so any assistance it could provide to Cuba against the fuel blockade would have to focus on other types of systemic solutions. Russia, on the other hand, is a carbon-producing country, as well as a military power. However, we have already witnessed an episode in which a Russian-flagged ship carrying Venezuelan crude oil was seized by the United States without any consequent action on the part of Russia. It is true that Russia could send to Cuba oil tankers protected by the Russian navy. But there are several factors to weigh in Russia’s calculation. Cuba also has a significant debt to Russia and has not yielded to the economic reforms suggested by the Russians[4], nor is it a client State. In fact, Cuba has been very firm in protecting its autonomous decision-making power and in establishing alliances and conducting negotiations with countries big and small, powerful or vulnerable alike without compromising the island’s independence or sovereignty. On the other hand, the Kremlin and the White House are clearly flirting with each other over the issue of the war in Ukraine: any Russian challenge to the United States in favor of Cuba could compromise Trump’s obvious partiality to Putin.
This picture describes the bilateral relationship that Cuba has long maintained with Russia and China. It explains why for a long time now the aid that China and Russia have provided to Cuba has been more a case of cardiopulmonary resuscitation than of comprehensive treatment aimed at a cure. Each time the situation in Cuba reaches a breaking point, they send a ship with gas or oil, make a donation of rice, or grant a small loan at a loss. But for years there have been no major investment moves, which is what Cuba needs to get out of its crisis. This is even more surprising when we compare, for example, China’s investments in Cuba to those in other Central American countries.
In ten years, Cuba’s government will bein the hands of the second or third generation born after the Revolution. Which of the trends vying for the strategic direction of the Cuban model will take the lead is one of the unknowns of Cuban politics. China and Russia would have good reasons to “wait and see” before committing to a situation that could have entirely changed in five years from now.
Finally, there is a significant political factor that could be having Beijing and the Kremlin act with great caution, and that is the stability of State power. The only stable, coherent, responsible State truly committed to an economic alternative to the US-led Western bloc in the whole world is Cuba, led by the historic leadership of the Cuban Revolution. Only that this leadership is, on average, over 80 years old. It is clear that in the next decade the country’s government will be fully in the hands of the second or third generation born after the Revolution. And while this historical leadership is a factor of discipline and unity among the different tendencies within the State vying for the strategic orientation of the Cuban model, which of these tendencies will take the lead is one of the unknowns of Cuban politics. China and Russia would have good reasons to “wait and see what happens” before committing to a situation that could have entirely changed in five years from now.
Despite all these factors that run counter to the geopolitical optimism of some on the Left who hope that Russia or China will intercede for Cuba like superheroes, there is at least one powerful reason—beyond statements and speeches—that could compel Russia and China to move from words to deeds. Cuba is not Maduro’s Venezuela, which the US and its allies managed to turn into a pariah State and, in a sense, into a discredited one. Cuba is a symbolically salient country, politically very dependable, and diplomatically highly respected. What message would the BRICS send about the much-vaunted nascent multipolarity if they allowed the United States to devour Cuba? Why would any other country, with much more to lose than Cuba, bet on the BRICS and expose itself to the wrath of the United States if it becomes clear that, when push comes to shove, the BRICS are going to leave it exposed? Cuba may not be the most coveted asset in the world, but the threat against Cuba clearly poses a test of credibility for the BRICS.
Cuba and the Latin American Left
The bilateral relationship between Cuba and the United States is highly sensitive to the ideological correlation of Latin American governments. Faced with a strong progressive wave on the continent, the aggressiveness of the United States yielded. Let us not forget that the Obama administration’s (partial) change of policy toward Cuba took place in a context in which a number of left-wing governments pressured Washington at the OAS to abandon its old approaches toward the island. Conversely, when right-wing governments rule most of the region’s major countries, hostility grows. This was the case during Trump’s first term. Today, however, we are facing a mixed scenario—albeit with a tendency toward the extreme right—in which it does not appear that the existence of progressive governments in Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, and Chile has translated into greater diplomatic security for Cuba, nor that any of them, when the time comes, will be able to provide Cuba with any substantive assistance.
Until January 3, Venezuela was Cuba’s main ally. The Venezuelan government that emerged from the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro maintains an attitude of rhetorical solidarity, paying lip service to the ties of friendship between Venezuela and Cuba, but in practice does nothing, either with regard to Cuba or with regard to Venezuela itself, that Washington does not order it to do. Perhaps this is all part of Venezuela’s plan to maintain “perfect peace and unity,” but such an attitude means that there will be no oil or any other economic support from Venezuela to Cuba. For all practical purposes, Venezuela has become a US vassal State and one on which Cuba cannot count for anything. It is a cruel irony to see how things have been reversed: in 2015, the Cuban government, in the midst of its honeymoon with Obama, paused to condemn in the strongest terms the carrot-and-stick policy. At that time, the carrot was for Cuba, and the stick for Venezuela.
Perhaps there are many on the Latin American Left who do not even understand that Cuba’s fall would have catastrophic consequences even for the increasingly colorless “progressivism.”
When it comes to the current situation surrounding the Caribbean island, Colombia, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile have remained timid, silent, or—in the latter case—have openly fallen into backstabbing. Some of these leftists treat Cuba as a kind of distant relative—now elderly, sick, and frankly burdensome, whom they still somewhat care for, but whom they would all be grateful to see pass away. They are weighed down by the use of Cuba as a toxic symbol that they must drag along in the culture wars, and by the vociferously heinous activism against Cuba that is deployed, not without effectiveness, by the politicized sector on the right of the Cuban diaspora. Perhaps they do not even understand—nor do so other Ibero-American leftists—that Cuba’s fall would have catastrophic conequences even for the increasingly colorless “progressivism.”
With its mere existence as a revolutionary socialist project—which, rhetorically at least, has not even renounced the communist horizon—and with its stubbornness when it comes to social justice and sovereignty, Cuba keeps the outward fence secured in the symbolic order, the imaginary, and the battle of ideas at the geopolitical scale, thus preventing the fence from being moved further backward. When that outward limit would no longer exist, the Left, which today seems moderate—but which the far right notheless shamelessly accuses of being “communist,” “authoritarian,” “dictatorial,” if not “totalitarian”—will be the new limit to move backward, the new radicals to push toward the realm of the unacceptable where they have tried to place Cuba, with the complicity of other alleged “leftists,” such as the impostor Boric. The right wing understands perfectly well Cuba’s place in the overall picture of the cultural battle against all leftists, but no Ibero-American Left sees it clearly enough. Are they even interested?
In any case, of all the above-mentioned countries, only Brazil is a major oil producer that could participate in Cuba’s energy relief. And yet Luis Inacio Lula da Silva’s silence regarding the January events in the Caribbean has come less as a surprise than as a signal, not to say as one more disappointment. One would assume that Brazil should also care about the test of credibility the BRICS are now facing.
The only country that in recent weeks has shown a clear willingness to help Cuba is Mexico. President Claudia Sheinbaum has defended quite firmly Mexico’s sovereign relationship with the island. She has even offered to mediate between Havana and Washington. This said, will Mexico stand up to Trump’s threats regarding Mexican fuel shipments to Cuba? The truth is that no matter how sincere and close the friendship between the two countries may be, it is impossible from any point of view for Sheinbaum’s government to expose Mexico to the considerable economic damage the US might inflict on it in order to “save” Cuba. It should be noted, however, that Mexico has a wide margin for negotiation with the United States that is denied to many others. Meanwhile, it is now a confirmed fact that Cubans are, once again, on their own.
Cuba’s solitude is not the result of any voluntary isolation or anachronistic political romanticism, but rather the logical corollary of the cold calculation of a world that claims to be moving toward multipolarity but still does not dare to assume its costs. For the United States, this solitude is a sign of Cuba’s exhaustion. Its strategic adversaries tolerate it as a foreign or secondary problem. A vast swath of the Ibero-American Left—in fact, all of it that has any degree of influence—views Cuba with discomfort, as if the problem were Cuba itself and not the aggression that has made Cuba so different from what it could have been under less onerous geopolitical circumstances—still independent, sovereign, socialist, revolutionary, and internationalist. Still, what is at stake far exceeds Cuba. If a country with Cuba’s symbolic, diplomatic, and political capital can be brought to the brink of collapse without anyone willing to take the risk of helping it decisively, then the promise of an alternative international order is seriously compromised and only serves to confirm what is increasingly obvious: that in a world dominated by decadent empires structurally condemned by their own rapacious political and moral corruption—the United States and post-Soviet Russia—as well and emerging empires that are no more noble or wise (China) such “alternative” international order is nothing more than a cruel joke. Cuba’s isolation and solitude is not only a national tragedy: it is an uncomfortable snapshot—yet another, after what we have already witnessed in Gaza—of the world to come, a world that is already here, and from which there may be no escape.
Notes
[1] United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Economic Sanctions, Agencies Face Competing Priorities in Enforcing the U.S. Embargo on Cuba.
[2] See, for example, “EE. UU. multa a Société Générale por romper embargo a Cuba”, DW, November 19, 2018.
[3] Nora Gámez Torres, “Enviado de Trump advierte de ‘sacrificios’ a corto plazo para poner presión a Cuba y Venezuela”, El Nuevo Herald, April 7, 2025.
[4] «Los economistas rusos le proponen a Cuba un plan que permita cambios económicos», Sputnik, March 30, 2023.
Translated from the full original text in Spanish (as such unpublished) by Rolando Prats.
Featured image: Cuban women march during a military parade in Havana’s Revolution Square on 16 April 2011, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the victory at Playa Girón (Bay of Pigs). Photo courtesy of Desmond Boylan (@DESBOYLAN) via X. Featured video: Fidel Castro addresses the UN General Assembly in his capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, October 12, 1979.
