“Um novo ciclo da esquerda brasileira?,” by Valério Arcary, originally appeared in Portuguese in the Brazilian media outlet A Terra é Redonda on July 30, 2025.
“By far the strongest and longest cycle in our history, the Petista era, saw the Left reach unprecedented influence and firmly embed itself socially. Predictably, overcoming it will be far more difficult than previous shifts. It will hinge on a massive rise in struggle, splits within PT and Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), and the active presence of collective political groups. Still, it is possible.”
— Valério Arcary
“The greatest error is acting prematurely and being too slow when the chance comes.”
Arab popular proverb
1.
The reconfiguration of the Brazilian Left is already underway, albeit at a haltingly gradual pace. Could this be the first glimmer of a politics untethered from Lulismo?
Many variables remain unclear. The two most significant are inseparable and bring us to the central dilemma: whether the Left can defeat the Far Right, and whether, in the unfolding process culminating with the 2026 elections, we will observe an increase in the workers’ and youth’s readiness to mobilise. These are the fundamental questions at stake.
The lessons of the past suggest that there can be no new cycle beyond Lulismo without the defeat of Bolsonarism and the awakening of mass mobilisation. Should defeat prevail, the Left will continue to suffer from fragmentation, splits and disunity. It would mean a regression, ushering in a historical pause akin to the one after 1964, one which, hopefully, we hope won’t last as long.
Revolutionary activists need to remain confident that, sooner or later, the working class will mobilise. Yet, the emergence of a cycle surpassing Lulismo cannot rely exclusively on this eventuality. Impromptu action has its place in political fights, but it is perilous. The window for the unexpected, the sudden, the jarring, the immediate, is narrow. The explosive surge of June 2013 showed us how openings can emerge… and be lost.
The”objectivist” approach, a simplistic, quietist sociological determinism, is a poor guide for action. The strength of awareness is grounded in commitment, intention, vision and organisation. Marxism is active struggle. Opening the way for new tools must be developed, both among social movements, especially feminist and Black movements, and in political struggle, which requires a stronger instrument than those currently at our disposal.
What can history tell us? In the last hundred years, the Left in Brazil has experienced five major cycles: anarcho-syndicalist, Getulist, communist, guerrilla, and Petista/Lulista. The passage from each cycle to the next resulted from sweeping objective changes in Brazil and internationally, coupled with relentless political and ideological struggles.
Transitions were mediated by intermediate stages, varying in complexity. The rise of Getulismo over anarcho-syndicalism can be traced, if we simplify, to the triumph of the 1930 revolution, the advent of industrialization, and the leadership of Getúlio Vargas. The communist cycle emerged under the impact of the defeat of Nazism and fascism, the influence of the Soviet Union, and the leadership of Luiz Carlos Prestes.
The guerrilla cycle leaned on the momentum brought in by the Cuban Revolution, the 1968 wave of student and worker mobilisations, and Marighella’s leadership. The Petista cycle was anchored in the mass struggles of the late dictatorship era, along with Lula’s role.
Yet we should maintain perspective. The anarcho-syndicalist cycle lasted less than twenty years. Getulismo dominated for roughly thirty and the communists co-led for less than fifteen. The armed struggle organisations held sway for five years. Lulismo has reigned over the Left for forty years. All who downplayed it were mistaken. It’s neither eternal nor unbeatable, but it endures.
2.
Looking across Latin America, the five most prominent Left-wing currents are Chavismo, Lulismo, Kirchnerismo, Bolivia’s MAS, and Uruguay’s Broad Front carrying forward the legacy of Pepe Mujica. Lulismo is not to be conflated with Kirchnerismo, the latest version of Peronismo, or with Chavismo. In relative terms, it has more strength than Kirchnerismo but doesn’t match the force of Chavismo.
Lulismo is stronger than Peronismo for two basic reasons: (i) its foundations lie in the core of Brazil’s organised social movements, in much of the progressive intelligentsia, and in the enduring strength of the PT, still one of the largest leftist parties worldwide; (ii) because Lula commands broader popular legitimacy on the Left than Cristina Kirchner.
Yet paradoxically, it is more fragile than post-Chávez Chavismo for two main reasons: (i) it did not emerge from a revolutionary moment like the 2002 coup attempt and its defeat; (ii) because it does not draw support from within the military. Lulismo is also a different kind of political force, one far more grounded in the working class than Mexico’s Morena under Claudia Sheinbaum, Chile’s Broad Front under Gabriel Boric, or the Historical Pact coalition led by Gustavo Petro in Colombia.
PT is also far more cohesive than Uruguay’s Broad Front, and the only party to have achieved a comparable level of social implantation was Evo Morales’s MAS, though the irreversible internal divisions of the Bolivian Left ultimately condemned it.
By far the strongest and longest cycle in our history, the Petista era, saw the Left reach unprecedented influence and firmly embed itself socially. Predictably, overcoming it will be far more difficult than previous shifts. It will hinge on a massive rise in struggle, splits within PT and Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), and the active presence of collective political groups. Still, it is possible.
For one, Petismo evolved into Lulismo, which is both its main strength and its core vulnerability. Longitudinal polling shows a clear dynamic: Lulismo has a shelf life. Why? (i) Because it relies on a relationship of personal trust with the poorest sectors; (ii) because the PT has failed to maintain majority influence among the “middle-layer” working classes, the more economically stable segments; (iii) because the lived experience of the masses of Lulismo’s mild reformist strategy has not been sufficient to win the ideological war for political consciousness.
PT is now completely dependent on Lula. Without him, Lulismo will struggle to survive, as no new figure has managed to command similar legitimacy. Without him, the party risks becoming a leaderless electoral structure, destined for irreversible decline.
3.
The reorganisation of the Left will be determined, above all, by how the battle against Bolsonarismo unfolds. On a broader level, it will also be conditioned by the international context, especially the popular pushback against Javier Milei in Argentina and Donald Trump in the global north. That victory might be explosive, driven by a wave of struggle before 2026, or it may arrive merely through the ballot box.
Should the Left prevail through a “cold” victory, we will likely see an open-ended extension of Lulismo, with PT consolidating around state governance. A “hot” victory, by contrast, would trigger a much more rapid dynamic: the limits of Lulismo would face sharper scrutiny amid surging expectations and demands. But the paths ahead would still be uncertain and exploratory, as internal shifts are not yet fully clarified.
What does seem certain is that potential splits within the PT will make room for a new vehicle of struggle, uniting parts of the radical Left. In the event of an electoral defeat, and the demoralisation it would bring, post-Lulismo would likely depend on the eruption of internal tensions within the PT, in a manner perhaps echoing the crisis that unraveled the PCdoB (Communist Party of Brazil) after 1964, likely shaped by an even further shift to the center by the party apparatus, and splits from the Left.
The path forward for the Left will be shaped by tensions and compromises between the old and the new, mostly in spite of Lulismo, but not necessarily discarding its legacy.
The recent outcome of the PT’s 2025 internal leadership elections (PED) made clear the strengthened position of Construindo um Novo Brasil (CNB), the dominant faction within the PT, a setback for the party’s internal leftist trends, and a decisive win for Edinho Silva. For those who had placed their hopes in the PT as a lever for leftward pressure on the government over the coming twelve months, the outcome is discouraging.
Those within the party pushing for a clearer anti-imperialist shift, particularly in response to U.S. pressure, were pushed to the margins. It’s not as if expectations were too high, No one knows better than the PT Left that theirs is a trench of resistance. Yet the modest vote totals for Rui Falcão and Valter Pomar in the internal leadership elections, even combined with those of Romênio Pereira, indicate an isolation teetering on the edge of irreversibility, almost irremediable
Such results authorize us to conclude that, despite the staggering internal battles within CNB, the brazen criticisms of concentrated power in the Treasury, the disproportionate threats from the Northeastern faction vying for the presidency, and even the abusive accusations against Washington Quaquá, the unity of the Lulist current, though torn apart by parliamentary and regional interest groups, has been preserved.
After all, no difference was irreconcilable. Why? There are three hypotheses. The election outcome makes clear that it was not irreconcilable had the leftist candidacies united. The CNB retains control over the party apparatus far beyond its political hegemony. Nor was it because of a strategic agreement on a political project for Brazil, no debates took place over the program. The third hypothesis is that unity was preserved, and Edinho secured a victory that consecrated him because Lula had requested it.
The internal, and even external, struggle within PT in the post-Lula phase will be contained until the 2026 elections for three main reasons, though other factors also exist: i) the first is objective in nature: an objective factor is one that imposes itself and cannot be avoided, Lula will be the candidate for re-election, and that shapes everything; ii) the second is subjective and boils down to the undeniable fact that there is no consensus within CNB on the program or on who should be the successor; iii) the third is that the successor will be appointed by Lula, albeit only after extensive negotiations and consultations.
4.
It is impossible to imagine the future of the reorganisation without the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) The very existence of PSOL, for over twenty years, amid the brutal conditions of political struggle within the Brazilian Left, is a feat worthy of recognition. PSOL has been a stronghold of dedicated social fighters, a welcoming space for socialists from the most diverse traditions. Its freedom from internal tendencies ensures that all currents can express themselves proportionally
PSOL draws in a broad segment of youth activism, and its presence in workplaces, neighborhoods, popular housing struggles, feminist movements, Black liberation efforts and the defense of LGBT rights is marked by a recognised commitment and energy. For the past two decades, PSOL has stood at the frontlines of internationalist mobilisations.
Building a radical Left party with institutional footing and legal viability, capable of giving visible form to a socialist agenda, was a bold gamble that demanded courage, resolve, and a deep faith in the future. It showed that a Left beyond PT was not only imaginable, but possible, even if still in the minority.
In Brazil’s two largest cities, PSOL reached the second round of the municipal elections, outpacing PT. It lost, just as PT would have. Like the rest of the Left, PSOL is not immune to structural pressures. It struggles with electoralism, corporatist trade unionism, bureaucratic inertia and internal proceduralism. It is not the revolutionary party idealised by segments of the vanguard imagination.
Yes, PSOL is deeply imperfect, but it is neither ossified nor barren, it remains a useful political instrument. Confronted with the at times overwhelming dominance of PT, it has provided a point of support for the most clear-sighted sectors of the militant Left, who refuse to accept that the only path toward the Brazilian revolution lies in retreating to a political project suited for a “museum”.
Both the Lulist sector and the ultra-radical Left tend to agree in viewing PSOL as possessing all the PT’s shortcomings but lacking its principal strength: its enduring majority support among Left-leaning sectors. In electoral terms, PT remains the most influential party on the Left. From a more explicitly “Marxist” perspective, PT is the party of the Left that commands the greatest trust from the working class.
PSOL’s perceived shortcomings can be summed up in three “original sins”: (i) that it is a party dominated by parliamentarians; (ii) that it operates as a front of factions lacking centralising capacity; and (iii) that it is fundamentally reformist. These are, in fact, half-truths. But a half-truth, as the saying goes, is a whole lie, a reductive simplification.
PSOL is, naturally, far from perfect. But that hasty assessment is neither accurate nor fair. PSOL is not simply an electoral apparatus, its activist role was indispensable in recent mobilisations, such as the March campaign against amnesty and the July demonstrations demanding taxation of the super-rich.
It is intellectually dishonest to minimise the fact that some of the most militant sectors within women’s, Black, popular housing, LGBT, environmental, Indigenous and cultural movements align themselves with PSOL. Despite its internal heterogeneity and the division between majority and minority camps, PSOL has maintained a noteworthy capacity for unified political intervention across the past two decades, albeit not without fluctuations.
Ultimately, there is no definitive rule for determining who qualifies as a revolutionary. In strict terms, two extreme positions present themselves, both inadequate: (i) that anyone who advocates for revolution is a revolutionary; or (ii) that only those who have led a revolution deserve the label. The first is overly expansive; the second, excessively restrictive. Despite being an electoral party, PSOL brings together a substantial portion, perhaps even a majority, of revolutionary activists on the Left.
Featured image: Lula addresses a crowd of supporters in Sao Bernardo Do Campo, 1989. Photo: Getty Images. In “Becoming Lula,” Boston Review, November 22, 2024.
Translated from the original in Portuguese by Noam Sala Budgen.
